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Elements of Hearing in Revocation of Parole
Proceedings*
In re Tate1 recently held that right to counsel in revocation-of-
parole proceedings was mandatory, despite the fact that recommit-
ment was by an administrative rather than a judicial tribunal. The
parolee's right to present evidence and adduce witnesses was also
held mandatory. The applicable District of Columbia statute2 pro-
vided for an "opportunity to appear" before revocation. The court
deduced: "opportunity to appear" necessarily demands recognition
of the right to a hearing;3 this requires the right to both counsel
and presentation of evidence;4 with these rights denied, the statute
was violated, and a writ of habeas corpus would issue.5 Constitu-
tional basis for the decision was denied.
The right to a hearing in revocation-of-parole cases has long been
litigated.6 Apparently it was recognized at common law.7 Although
it has been held an element of constitutional due process under state
decisions,8 some finding a violation of both federal and state con-
stitutions,9 the federal cases now clearly indicate that the right
* This case note also appeared in (1946) 41 Illinois Law Review
277.
163 F. Supp. 961 (D.C. D.C. 1946).2 Indeterminate Sentence and Parole Act of the District of Colum-
bia, D. C. Code (1940) §24-205, 206.3 This is by no means a necessary conclusion. "'Appearance' in the
law has several significations, and the word must always be understood
in reference to the particular . . . subject matter to which it relates. In
some cases it means to appear in person; in others by attorney" (italics
supplied). Pope: Legal Definitions, Chicago; Callaghan and Co., 1919.
Only one early case, Dundee Mortgage Trust Investment Co. v. Charlton,
Sheriff, etc., 32 Fed. 192 (D.C. Ore., 1887), may be cited on this point:
"The right 'to appear' before a tribunal.., implies the right to be heard.
thereabout; so far, at least, as the party is 'interested.'"
4 The court apparently regarded the right to a hearing and the
right to counsel as independent. This view is sustained by the Constitu-
tional Amendments. It was the view expressed in State ex rel. Charles
v. Port Commissioners of New Orleans, 159 La: 70, 105 So. 228 (1925):
"We think the right to be heard is one thing, and the right to be assisted
by counsel is quite another thing." Since, however, the parolee's rights
here came under statute, there is little basis for finding any right to
counsel except as such a right inheres in the hearing prescribed by that
statute.
5 The order of the court was stayed for a reasonable time to allow
"proceedings for .. . revocation . . . in conformity with statute."
6 Early cases are Rex v. Miller, [1771] 1 Leach 74, 168 Eng. Rep. 139.
People v. James, 2 Caines 57 (N.Y. 1804), State v. Barnes, 32 S.C. 14,
10 S.E. 611 (1847), and People v. Potter, 1 Parker Cr. Rep. 47 (N.Y.
1846). The last case contains an opinion by Bronson, Attorney General
of New York, in 1829, which found the basis for a right to a hearing in
"a just regard for personal liberty."
7 State ex rel. O'Conner v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N.W. 1065
(1893) : "The procedure . . . is governed by the rules of the common
law." See also Alvarez v. State, 50 Fla. 24, 39 So. 481 (1905). People
v. Burns, 28 N.Y.S. 300 (1894), aff'd 143 N.Y. 665, 39 N.E. 21 (1894)
recognised that the mode adopted by the lower court "had authority of
precedent"; People ex rel. Stumpf v. Craig, 140 N.Y.S. 652 (1913) re-
led on "elementary principles of criminal jurisprudence."
8 Comm. ex rel. Meredith v. Hall, 277 Ky. 612, 126 S.W. (2d) 1056(1939). Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 Pac. 713 (1917) was a sim-
ilar case involving violation of a suspended sentence order. But many
states have found no due process violation. Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga.
177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937).
9 People ex rel. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909).
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comes only by statute.'0 The constitutional approach, however, is
by no means dead.'"
Statutes covering revocation procedure now exist in most states.
About half expressly deny the right to a hearing in such cases;
12
some expressly provide for it. 1 3 In addition to express statutory
sanction of summary revocation, many ,courts have denied the right
to a hearing because a provision in the parolee's release statement
has stipulated summary revocation; 14 this is the "contract' ap-
proach.15 Other courts have revoked paroles without a hearing on a
"constructive custody" concept.16 Where the applicable statutes
deal with the right only by implication, the duty of determining the
existence of the right has fallen to the courts. Theirs has likewise
been the task of determining the elements of the hearing.
In those revocation-of-parole cases where a hearing has been
sanctioned, either expressly 17 or by judicial implication,18 the ele-
ments necessary are shadowy in outline. There would seem to be a
general requirement of orderly procedure,19 and a right of the ae-
cused to be present at the hearing, at least personally.20 There is a
right to a jury trial if the, question of identity of the person to be
recommitted is involved.21 - The rights to counsel, to present evi-
10 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1934).
11 Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. (2d) 982 (C.C.A. 6th, 1941).
12Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Tennessee, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyo-
ming have statutes to this effect. See Weihofen, Revoking Probation,
Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing (1942) 32 J. Crim. Law & Crim.
531. Courts generally distinguish competently the three different re-
lease categories-pardon, conditional pardon and parole, and handle
cases in the last two similarly.
13 California, New York, North Dakota and Tennessee have such
provisions. Unless appeal is provided for, as in Illinois, the remedy
for error in the hearing, or for failure to grant a hearing, is by habeas
corpus.
'14 EX parte Foster, 60 Okla. Crim. Rep. 50, 61 P. (2d) 37 (1936);
Ex parte Frazier, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 475, 239 S.W. 972 (1922); Wood-
ward v. Murdock, 124 Ind. 439, 24 N.E. -1047 (1890). But see Plunkett
v. Miller, 161 Ga. 466, 131 S.E. 170 (1925), where it was held that a
consent to summary recommitment could not remove the duty to hear
imposed by statute.
15 This unrealistic approach follows an early Supreme Court case,
United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (1833).
16 "The paroled prisoner is until discharged finally constructively
in imaginative jail limits, which may be narrowed or widened as appears
proper to the commission." People ex rel. Romain v. Parole Commis-
sion, 191 N.Y.S. 410 (1921), aff'd without opinion, 197 N.Y.S. 940
(1921).
17 See supra note 13.
is A long list of cases is collected in Weihofen, Revoking Probation,
Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing (1942) 32 J. Crim. Law and Crim.
531. Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota and New York decisions
read a hearing requirement into the statutes.
19 See Roberts v. Anderson, 66 F. (2d) 874 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933),
where a confusion of counsel brought due process violation.
20 See supra note 3.
21 Alvarez v. State, 50 Fla. 24, 39 So. 481, (1905) and State ex rel.
O'Conner v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N.W. 1065 (1893) recognize this
as a matter 6f right. State v. Everett, 164 N.C. 339, 79 S.E. 274 (1913)
holds that there is no such right. If found to exist it may be waived.
State v. Charles, 107 S.C. 413, 93 S.E. 134 (1917). New York requires
a jury trial on the general question of whether the conditions of parole
have been violated; Code of Criminal Procedure, c. 478, §696.
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dence, and to adduce witnesses have been granted.22 The full re-
quirements of a judicial hearing, including the right to counsel, the
right to produce evidence, the right to cross-examine, the right to
findings, and to an appeal from findings, 23 are decreed infrequently.
The more general trend is to preserve only those elements which the
applicable statute's background and purpose demand_24 Proper rec-
ognition of the character of administrative action supports this
view.25
Under the federal act covering pardon and parole,2 6 a hearing
before a district court, acting in an administrative rather than a
judicial capacity, is expressly granted. The Supreme Court in
Burns v. United States27 gave the general outline of individual guar-
antees in such a hearing.28 The Burns case concerned a defendant
who violated parole by unduly absenting himself from jail, where
he was confined for another crime, permission having been granted
for him to be absent when necessary for dental treatment. Upon
complaint of summary proceedings to recommit, the Court said,
"There are no limiting requirements as to the . . . manner of hear-
ing or determination." United States v. Moore29 stated that the
appointment of counsel was discretionary. Christianson v. Zerbst °
sanctioned the use of hearsay testimony, following the liberal lead
of Morrell v. Baker.3s  But there is pointed language in other fed-
22 Counsel: People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912) ;
Sellers v. State, 105 Neb. 748, 181 N.W. 862 (1921); Evidence: Chris-
tianson v. Zerbst, 89 F. (2d) 40 (C.C.A. 10th, 1937); Howe v. State,
170 Tenn. 571, 98 S.W. (2d) 93 (1936); Witnesses: Morrell v. Baker,
270 Fed. 577 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1920); Robinson v. State, 62 Ga. App. 539,
8 S.E. (2d) 698 (1940).
23 This is required by North Dakota statute. See Vadnais v. Stair,
48 N.D. 472, 185 N.W. 301 (1921).
24 Much depends on the person or agency revoking. If complete
power is placed in the giver of the pardon, ordinarily the governor,
courts are willing to find more rights in more hearings. "Statutes are
not directory when to put them in-that category would result in serious
impairment of the public or the private interests that they were in-
tended to protect." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 494 (1932). Perhaps
the "different statute-different hearing" concept of Mr. Justice Cardozo
in Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294
(1933), most logically explains the decisions.
25 Hearings before administrative bodies are ordinarily quicker, less
expensive, helpful in lightening courts' loads. The pertinency of these
considerations is usually admitted by courts; they are often unable,
however, to give them determining weight on the facts of a particular
case. Some have. In Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932), the
Court said, "The hearing was summary but it cannot be said that it was
improper or inadequate, in view of the nature of the proceeding ......
In Morrell v. Baker, 270 Fed. 577 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1920), the court said,
"Hearings before administrative bodies . . . are not subject to the rules
governing judicial proceedings . . . the hearing may be summary."
26Federal Probation Act, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925), 18 U.S.C.A. §724
(1927).27 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
28 "The question, then, in the case of revocation of probation, is not
one of formal procedure either with respect to notice or specification of
charges or a trial upon the charges. The question is simply one of abuse
of discretion," id. at 222.
29 101 F. (2d) 56 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1939), cert. den. 306 U.S. 664 (1939).
It has never been argued that the right to counsel, unquestioned in the
original judicial proceeding, carried over to the revocation proceeding,
on the theory of the right being required at every stage of trial. See
Harris v. Norris, 188 Ga. 610, 4 S.E. (2d) 840 (1939).
3089 F. (2d) 40 (C.C.A. 10th, 1937).
31 270 Fed. 577 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1920). This case clearly foreshadowed
Burns v. United States, cited supra note 27.
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eral cases 32 construing the same statute33 that seems to read limita-
tions into the hearing requirement. The necessity of further safe-
guards is implied. These cases, perhaps more in point for support
of the principal case, were ignored by- it.
Here the court relied most heavily on Escoe v. Zerbst,3 4 where a
criminal was arrested and returned to jail without a hearing of any
kind, in direct violation of the mandate of the federal statute that
he "be forthwith taken before the court." There is little parallel
with the principal case, where a timely hearing3 5 was given before
the parole board. There are passages in the Escoe case broad
enough and narrow enough 36-depending upon the viewpoint-to
sustain a determination either way on the questions of counsel, the
presentation of evidence, and the right to witnesses:" .
Under state parole statutes, some decisions have clearly: ruled on
elements of a revocation hearing.3 7 There has been the same gen-
eral .outline as appeared in the federal cases.35  Ordinarily, how-
ever, stte courts have merely sanctioned a lower court's procedure,
and have refrained from holding any particular elements necessary.
The right to counsel, to produce evidence, and to adduce witnesses
have all been recognized in this manner.3 9
Since, in almost half the states, a hearing itself is not mandatory
in revocation-of-parole cases, 40 and in others the hearing granted
may be summary in character,41 this decision could be regarded as
burdening the District of Columbia parole statute with a hearing
whose elements were beyond legislative intent. Statutes covering
revocation procedures were enacted against a background of "full
bearing" already recognized; 42 their primary significance is in the
extent to which they change pre-existing procedures. Moreover,
these statutes commonly provide for commissions and boards com-
32 Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F. (2d) 729, (C.C.A. 10th, 1939), called
the right to counsel "constitutional." Hollandsworth v. United States,
34 F. (2d) 423, (C.C.A. 4th, 1929) called for violations to be "judicially
determined."
33 Federal Probation Act, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925), 18 U.S.C.A. §724
(1927).
34 295 U.S. 490 (1934).
35 "In November 1945, he was apprehended. . . . On December 6,
1945 he was given a hearing before the Board. The hearing resulted
in a revocation of his parole."
36 Consider the following: "Probation... comes as an act of grace,
and may be coupled with such conditions . . . as Congress may impose."
"... there shall be an inquiry so fitted in its range to the needs of the
occasion as to justify the conclusion that discretion has not been abused.
." In a large part, the District of Columbia court's opinion was an
extract of Escoe v. Zerbst, in which extract the above passages were
included. This language would seem to indicate a Congressional intent
to limit the scope of recommitment hearings under the federal statute.
37 See supra note 22. Jury trial: (statute) People ex rel. Rabiner
v. Warden, 205 N.Y.S. 694 (1924); Huff v. Dyer, 4 Ohio C.C. 595 (1890).
Revocation by partial board: People ex rel. Seiler v. Hill, 348 Ill. 441,
181 N.E. 295 (1932).
38 "A paroled prisoner is not entitled to any judicial hearing or
determination by a court." People ex rel. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ill.
359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909).
39 People v. Burns, 28- N.Y.S. 300 (1894), aff'd 143 N.Y. 665, 39
N.E. 21 (1894).
40 See supra note 12.
41 Summary hearings only are provided for in Kansas, Massachu-
setts and Michigan. See Re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 146 Pac. 1009
(1915).
42 See supra notc 7.
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posed of laymen;48 it must have been intended that legal personnel
and techniques be dispensed with. "Strict observance of technical
rules of law and procedure accorded parties in a judicial proceeding
is not required in such a hearing before an administrative body.""
'Whether or not a hearing will be allowed at all in such cases must,
of course, remain a policy consideration for the respective govern-
ments; where a hearing is sanctioned, strong administrative argu-
ments compel that it be summary in character-without the panoply
of judicial safeguards.45 This is a more enlightened approach. 46
James William Belshaw
43 There is a vast difference of opinion as to the capability of the
administrators. See Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative
Law (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1201.
44 Christianson v. Zerbst, cited supra note 30.
45See supra note 25.
46 "The very least that it can mean, however, is that the defendant
be apprised of the facts alleged to constitute the violation of his proba-
tion, and that he be given an opportunity to inform the court of any
facts which would tend to contradict, explain, or mitigate the violation."
People v. Hill, 300 N.Y.S. 532 (1937).
